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DOCKOMINIUMS: AN EXPANSION OF RIPARIAN 
RIGHTS THAT VIOLATES THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE 
Mark Cheung* 
Two thousand miles I roam, 
Just to make this dock my home .... 
Otis Redding & Steve Cropper 
(The Dock of the Bay) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The recreational boating system may well be headed toward 
a system of individual ownership of slip spaces. Just as rental 
apartments can be converted for sale as condominiums, rental 
slip spaces can be converted for sale as dockominiums. The 
dockominium concept, a lucrative response to the demands 
of the boating public, though, may find very little sanction in the 
law. 
The recent development of selling boat slip spaces has propelled 
the dockominium concept toward a collision course with the riparian 
rights and public trusts doctrines. The current trend of increasing 
demand for dock space, coupled with a reduction in publicly available 
space and a less than parallel increase in marinas, 1 casts light on the 
dockominium's conflict with the common law. Such a conflict is 
brought to light by the apparent approval of the federal government 
through the issuance, by the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
* Citations and Articles Editor, 1988-89, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
LAW REVIEW. The author acknowledges the tremendous assistance and support of Peter 
Alpert and Rebecca S. Webber. 
1 Behar, Dockbroker Ed, Forbes, September 21, 1987, at 166-68. 
821 
822 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:821 
(Corps), of permits for marinas and piers designated for dockomi-
nium-type ownership. 2 
The dockominium concept is premised on the notion that individ-
uals may own exclusive control of the water within a boat slip space. 3 
A dockominium is an individual boat slip space,4 or finger float slips,5 
that a marina sells or leases long-term to an individual boater. Each 
slip space services, or moors, one boat. The concept is analogous to 
the conversion of an apartment building to condominiums. 6 Some 
commercial marinas either sell part of their slip space inventory as 
dockominiums,7 or sell all of their slip spaces, while retaining own-
ership of the upland facility for providing boating services. 8 In some 
instances, the marinas sell the entire facility to a condominium de-
veloper, who then privatizes the slip spaces and eliminates the boat-
yard. 9 Such dockominium transformations are essentially a creative 
2 The United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is authorized under 33 U.S.C. § 403 
(1982), a permitting provision, to regulate docks and other obstructions of the waterways. 
Section 403 is the codification of § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 
(Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121). Permits issued for docks and marinas are 
commonly referred to as section 10 permits. 
3 Reis, Dockominiums, in CONFERENCE ON GULF & SOUTH ATLANTIC FISHERIES: LAW & 
POLICY 179, 180 (1987) (published proceedings of a conference held in New Orleans on March 
18-20, 1987) [hereinafter Reis, NEW ORLEANS CONFERENCE]. In operation, the dockominium 
concept involves an expansion of the riparian rights doctrine to an unique usage, and that 
usage implicates the public trust. This Comment assumes that riparian dockominium owners, 
possessing no upland interest, value their riparian rights solely for the accompanying right to 
exclude other boaters from using their dockominium space. 
4 "Slip spaces" or "slips" refer generally to spaces, at docks or piers, used by boats for 
mooring purposes. This is analogous to parking spaces for automobiles. 
5 Most marina docks take the form of floating piers. A floating pier is a "pier built to float 
on the surface of water." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 481 (3d ed. 1969). Most piers are 
designed with finger-like perpendicular extensions. Such structural projections are commonly 
called finger floats, piers, or slips. The design creates U -shaped slip spaces. The term "finger 
pier" was used, but not defined, by the court in Yachting Arcade v. Riverwalk Condominium 
Ass'n, 500 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986). 
6 For a discussion of condominium conversions, see Note, Condominium Conversion Leg-
islation: Limitation on Use or Deprivation?-A Re-examination, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 815 
(1980). 
7 Some marina operators opt to convert some of the slips into dockominiums. Thus, the 
marina can still operate as a full service marina, capable of even accommodating transient 
boaters. Reis, NEW ORLEANS CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 183-87. 
8 See id. Some marinas may convert all available slip spaces into dockominiums. Such 
marinas may retain the upland facilities for servicing the dockominium owners. Because the 
completed conversion fixes the clientele base, the upland facilites can be reduced to only 
maintenance capabilities and instead there would be upland space available for introducing 
social services such as a club and lounge. 
9 The boat slips in the condominium projeet would be allocated to the owners of the upland 
condominium units. 
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business effort to meet boaters' demands for water access and to 
maximize economic profit in the process. 10 
The initial analysis suggests that the Corps should not be approv-
ing the dockominium concept consistent with a proper consideration 
of the public interest. 11 The principles underlying the doctrines of 
public trust and riparian rights, however, appear to preclude the 
claim of exclusivity in the water that is basic to the dockominium 
concept. While the two doctrines are established in the jus corpus, 
the dockominium is merely a recent economic development and its 
legality has not been extensively challenged. 12 The dockominium is 
a concept, not a legal construct, that merely refers to a form of 
individual ownership interest in boat slip space. 13 Therefore, in light 
of the dockominium's novelty, the critical inquiry is whether the 
dockominium concept is a permissible expansion of the riparian 
rights doctrine that is consistent with the public trust doctrine and 
that survives a regulatory, public interest analysis. 
The proliferation of dockominium conversions and developments 
is due primarily to an increased demand for access to the nation's 
waters.14 Millions of people participate in boating and sport fishing 
in coastal waters, thus increasing the demand for small-boat harbors 
and marinas. 15 Dockominium proliferation is further encouraged 
by the financial attractiveness of the dockominium concept. 16 Thus, 
10 Reis, NEW ORLEANS CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 181-83. 
11 The Corps must conduct a public interest review when consiaering applications for section 
10 permits. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1987); see infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text. 
12 See Matthews v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 993 (M.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd 
in part, 713 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1983) (only known reported case concerning a dockominium 
permitted by the Corps). 
13 Reis, NEW ORLEANS CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 180. 
14 See L.A. TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 271-73,291 (1985). 
15 [d. at 291. Although waterfront properties are generally valued for their recreational 
purposes, coastal waterfronts tend to be more desirable than those in the interior. [d. A 
federal district court has recognized that recreation and fishing are beneficial uses of water. 
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 503 F. Supp. 877, 883 (D. Nev. 1980), aff'd 
in part and vacated in part, 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); see 
also McClellan v. Jantzen, 26 Ariz. App. 223, 547 P.2d 494, 496 (1976). Thus, some coastal 
marine economies are called upon to meet a regional and even national recreational demand, 
in addition to a local one. 
16 In some New York City area marinas, a 32-foot boat slip dockominium may cost $44,500, 
up from $17,500 two years ago. Geist, 'Dockominium',' A Bronx Haven, For $63,000 or So, 
N. Y. Times, June 24, 1987 at B1, col. 1. Likewise, a 42-foot dockominium is around $63,000, 
up from $31,000 two years ago. [d. Nationally, slipspace prices average at least $1000 per 
foot and are currently rising. Behar, supra note I, at 166-68; see Fisher, Dockominiums, 
N.Y. Times, September 20, 1987, § 3, at I, col. 1. This spiralling of the dockominium values 
has been triggered by annual increases in boats versus decreases in marina facilities, and by 
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the emergence of the dockominium adds to the problem of increasing 
scarcity in the amount of dock spaces and full service 
boatyards. 17 
The dockominium concept of private ownership of individual dock-
ing units, or slips, takes on different legal forms, depending on the 
state jurisdiction. 18 In some jurisdictions, such as Connecticut, the 
dockominium transaction involves the transfer of riparian rights, 19 
separating riparian rights from upland rights. 20 In other jurisdic-
tions, such as Massachusetts, where the language of the condomi-
nium laws is expressly limited to land-based residential condomi-
niums, developers have avoided the potential legal confrontation 
simply by opting for lease arrangements, thus avoiding condominium 
type conveyances.21 
The dockominium thus involves the interaction of traditional con-
dominium law, the riparian rights doctrine, and the public trust 
doctrine. Regardless of the technical format used to establish the 
dockominium, the arrangement intends to provide what amounts to 
an exclusive property interest in the water.22 Water, however, is a 
resource held in trust by the government for the use and benefit of 
a growing acknowledgment that dockominiums present a considerable investment potential< 
See Geist, supra. 
17 Dock spaces have not been increasing at a sufficient rate to meet the demands of a rapidly 
growing number of boat owners. Interviews with Brian E. Valiton, Case Handling Specialist, 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New England Division, Waltham, Massachusetts (1987-1988) 
[hereinafter Valiton Interviews]. Approximately 700,000 new pleasure boats were launched 
in the United States in 1986 with at least ten percent of them large enough to need a slipspace, 
while the number of marinas declined three percent in the same year. Behar, supra note 1, 
at 166. 
18 Brian E. Valiton, Internal memorandum of the Corps of Engineers, para. 2 (CENED-
OD-R-31, subject: "Issues Relating to Dockominium Project, Either New or as Conversion of 
Existing Marinas," length: 2 pages) (October 6, 1987) (on file with author); Reis, NEW OR-
LEANS CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 194-97. 
19 See Buck, Drafting Dockominium Documents, in NATIONAL DOCKOMINlUM CONFER-
ENCE: THE OPPORTUNITIES & PROBLEMS (1987) (published proceedings of a conference held 
in New Haven, Connecticut on August 25-26,1987) [hereinafter NEW HAVEN CONFERENCE]; 
Reis, Dockominiums Are Legally Allowed, in NEW HAVEN CONFERENCE, supra, at 132. 
20 A riparian proprietor is one who owns land (the upland) bordering on a natural water-
course and has certain rights (the riparian rights) to use the water that flows by such an 
upland property. See CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 299 (1962). Under 
some state jurisdictions, the riparian right to use or access the water flow may be severed or 
alienated from the upland by conveyance or lease contract. 
21 In Massachusetts, many marinas provide dockominiums under a long-term lease arrange-
ment. Such lease terms may range up to ninety-nine years. (Marketing brochures offering 
such slip spaces are on file with author.) 
22 See generally text accompanying infra notes 28--33. 
1989] DOCKOMINIUMS 825 
the general pUblic.23 In that light, the dockominium concept portrays 
a confrontation between the private claim in the boat slip space and 
the public interests in the water. Thus, the significant legal issue 
posed by the dockominium is whether the concept is a permissible 
hybrid of these settled legal doctrines. 
This Comment discusses the legitimacy of dockominiums by ex-
amining existing water rights laws and describing how laws have 
been manipulated to allow for the emergence of the dockominium. 
The second section of this Comment discusses the settled doctrines 
of public trust and riparian rights, and the role of the Corps in 
respect to the dockominium. The third section considers whether 
the dockominium concept is consistent with the doctrines of riparian 
rights and public trust and whether the Corps should issue permits 
for dockominium structures. 
This Comment concludes that the dockominium, although it does 
not violate the riparian rights doctrine, it does violate the public 
trust doctrine. The dockominium concept, despite its creative ma-
nipulation of riparian rights, does not adversely impact water qual-
ity, quantity, or flow, and thus does not violate the riparian rights 
doctrine. The dockominium violates the public trust by impeding the 
public's full access to the waterways and by creating a private claim 
of ownership upon water owned by the public. Because the dock-
ominium concept offends the public trust doctrine, the Corps must 
weigh this adverse impact against any public benefits that a partic-
ular dockominium development may confer. In most instances, this 
inquiry should lead the Corps to conclude that the dockominium is 
an unacceptable burden on the public trust. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE DOCKOMINIUM AND ITS EFFECT UPON 
THE PUBLIC TRUST AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS DOCTRINES 
The dockominium concept relies on the conveyance of riparian 
rights.24 The riparian owner's most significant right is the right to 
use the water.25 Here, the right is exercised by mooring a boat in 
23 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); infra notes 49--56 and accompanying text. 
24 Reis, NEW ORLEANS CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 187 ("The interest acquired [for the 
dockominium] is the interest in the outshore area represented by the slip space."); Nixon, 
Challenges to the Public Trust Doctrine, in NEW HAVEN CONFERENCE, supra note 19, at 
118-19. 
25 See 1A G.W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
§ 273 (1980). 
826 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:821 
the slip space. For the purposes of creating a dockominium facility, 
riparian rights are subdivided and conveyed separately, consistent 
with the sizes of the slip spaces, which then constitute the separate 
dockominium units. Such a transaction is, in most instances, based 
on the severability of riparian and upland rights. 26 The transaction 
is thus intended to convey a fixed parcel of riparian rights in the 
form of a dockominium unit. 27 The riparian rights are thus subdivided 
and conveyed separately, consistent with the sizes of the slip spaces, 
which then constitute the separate dockominium units. 
Riparian rights conveyancing is the preferred, and logical, vehicle 
for the dockominium concept, because the concept seeks to make 
ownership of each unit exclusive.28 Ownership of the riparian rights 
within the dockominium unit is designed to provide the owner with 
a power to exclude others, or at the very least, to provide the owner 
a preferred right to use the slip. This exclusivity provides unit 
owners with what is hoped to be an exclusive property interest. The 
desire for exclusivity is understandable in light of the usually sig-
nificant financial investment required for the right to place a boat in 
the unit. 29 
Alienability is the riparian rights attribute that provides the 
flexibility and convenience needed to facilitate the creation 
of most dockominium complexes. 30 When the riparian rights 
are alienable from the upland, dockominium purchasers need 
not buy the adjoining land. Such riparian rights are alienated 
from the upland and subdivided to conform to the 
configuration of the actual slip space. 31 Dockominium developers, in 
26 Most jurisdictions permit the riparian owners to sever and convey away separately these 
riparian rights from the other traditional land ownership rights. See infra text accompanying 
notes 125-27. Therefore, X may own the riparian upland while Y may own the riparian rights 
to the water fronting X's upland property. 
Z7 See Appendix. 
28 Owners of riparian rights possess preferred rights to the use of the waterflow and of the 
water itself. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (D. R.1. 1827) (No. 14,312) (Story, Circuit 
Justice). In light of the water rights that the riparian rights doctrine confers upon the riparian 
owners, the dockominium concept finds its genesis in the doctrine. Compare infra notes 32-
33. 
29 See supra note 16 for a sampling of dockominium prices. 
30 Simons v. French, 25 Conn. 346, 352 (1856); Williams v. Skyline Dev. Corp., 265 Md. 130, 
155-56, 288 A.2d 333, 348 (1972). The subdivision of riparian rights is the better method of 
creating dockominiums. The two alternative means, in subdividing either the riparian upland 
or the dock structure, do not provide the adequate water rights conveyances for the dock-
ominium concept. See infra text accompanying notes 121-26. 
31 See Appendix. 
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the most basic form of a dockominium transaction, convey such 
subdivided riparian rights parcels to purchasers. The transaction 
involves no conveyance of the dock structure,32 and rarely the up-
land. 33 
The creation of dockominium units is facilitated in most jurisdic-
tions by state condominium law. In those states that adopted flexible 
condominium statutes, the statutory language can be construed to 
32 The legitimacy of the dockominium conveyance would not be enhanced by conveying the 
physical dock structure. Conveyance of the dock structure as the dockominium unit, although 
initially tempting, does not carry an exclusive right to the water. See THOMPSON, supra note 
25, § 274, at 454 (the public possesses the right to enjoy the use of the water and the surface 
water of navigable waters where title to the submerged bed is in the state under the public 
trust theory). In effect, owning a portion of the dock amounts to no more than ownership of 
personalty, with no appurtenant rights to the water. If the unit owners possess no exclusive 
property interest in the unit space itself, then they cannot prevent others from entering and 
occupying the water within the unit. The dockominium concept, as arranged by riparian rights 
subdivisions, assumes that there can be private ownership in the water lying within the 
slipspace. See Appendix. But see Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894) (title in the water 
belongs with the sovereign). If so, ownership in the water would entitle the owner to exclude. 
By contrast, ownership in the dock structure provides no such exclusive privileges in the 
water. Owning just the structure without anything more would defeat the purpose of owning 
a dockominium unit. 
33 The dockominium conveyance is not fatally defective although it does not involve the 
transfer offee interests in real estate. Simons v. French, 25 Conn. at 351--54 (riparian rights 
may be conveyed separately from the riparian upland). The dockominium conveyance need 
not, and should not, require subdivision of the upland. Subdivision of riparian upland, alone, 
does not provide the desired result of divided riparian rights. Essentially, the upland subdi-
vision does not eliminate the need to further divide the riparian rights to fit the design of the 
dockominium configuration. Thus, the added transaction of subdividing the upland is both 
inefficient and ineffective by itself. 
As an added problem, subdivision of the upland may produce subdivided tracts that lose 
physical contact with the water. Such tracts would be land-locked. In some states, an inland 
tract that loses contact with the water upon subdivision loses its riparian attributes solely 
because of its separation from the water. Murphy Slough Ass'n v. Avila, 27 Cal. App. 3d 649, 
657-58, 104 Cal. Rptr. 136, 142-43 (1972); Yearsly v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285,288,270 P. 804, 
805 (1928); Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d 501, 528-29, 81 P.2d 533, 547 (1938) 
(land is riparian only if it is contiguous to the water; is part of the smallest tract held under 
one title with the riparian rights intact, and is within the watershed of the waterway); Hudson 
v. West, 47 Cal. 2d 823, 829, 306 P.2d 807, 809-10 (1957); see THOMPSON, supra note 25, 
§ 275, at 461. The inutility of using the upland as the primary basis for the dockominium 
conveyance demonstrates that the dockominium favors a conveyance of riparian rights, and 
not of upland property. 
Ownership of the riparian uplands, moreover, is not generally a requisite for ownership of 
the riparian rights. See Mianus Realty Co. v. Greenway, 151 Conn. 128, 131-32, 193 A.2d 
713, 715 (1963). Most jurisdictions permit separate ownership of the upland and of the riparian 
rights arising from that upland. See, e.g., Simons v. French, 25 Conn. at 352; Skyline Dev. 
Corp., 265 Md. at 155-56, 288 A.2d at 348. In such situations, the riparian rights are alienated 
or separated from the land. 
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allow for the creation of the dockominium concept. 34 For instance, 
the language of the Connecticut statute expressly allows for the 
creation of condominiums from "spaces ... filled with air or water. "35 
Thus, developers use condominium or co-ownership statutes to sub-
divide riparian rights into parcels and sell them as dockominiums. 
By contrast, a dockominium cannot be created under the Massa-
chusetts condominium statute. 36 The Massachusetts legislation 
speaks of "condominium" and "unit" with reference to "rooms," 
"buildings," or "land. "37 The Massachusetts language makes it vir-
tually impossible to interpret the statute to refer to the creation of 
dockominiums. 38 
In those states that have enacted condominium statutes strictly 
and narrowly applicable only to the traditional land-based condomi-
nium,39 dockominium developers resort to the use of long-term leases 
to effect the practical equivalent of a dockominium. 40 Stressing func-
tion over form, the long-term leasing of a boat slip is tantamount to 
the actual conveyance of fee interests in subdivided riparian rights, 
as is permitted in states with permissive condominium statutes. 41 
The dockominium is conceptually similar to the condominium be-
cause both involve the division and co-ownership of an asset previ-
ously owned by a single entity. As condominiums are tenant-owned 
apartments, dockominiums are user-owned boat slip spaces. The 
condominium developers divide and convey fee simple interests in 
real estate42 that they own subject to nothing but the state's police 
34 "'Real property' means any leasehold or other estate or interest in, over, or under land 
... [and] includes parcels with or without upper or lower boundaries, and spaces that may 
be filled with air or water." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-202(26) (West 1986). Moreover, 
dwelling and recreation are considered to be residential purposes. [d. § 47-202(27). Connect-
icut's condominium statute is consistent with the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 
7 U.L.A. 237-400 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (adopted by Alaska, Connecticut, and West Virginia). 
35 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-202(26). 
36 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 183A, § 1(8) (1987) (a condominium unit includes "one or more 
rooms, with appurtenant areas"). The Massachusetts statute makes no mention of space 
ownership. 
37 [d. §§ 1-2. 
38 It is highly unlikely that courts will construe the Massachusetts condominium statute to 
authorize dockominiums, because the language refers to land-based properties and is silent as 
to water-related condominiums. 
39 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 183A. 
40 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
41 Marketing brochures of Massachusetts marinas offering 99-year leases for slip spaces are 
on file with the author. 
42 Each condominium owner has exclusive ownership of the individual condominium unit, as 
well as a percentage interest in all common elements of the condominium development, 
including the real estate. Reskin, Overview and Comparison with Cooperatives, in 4 Coop-
1989] DOCKOMINIUMS 829 
and zoning powers. The dockominium developers, however, convey 
riparian rights that are subject to peculiar doctrinal and governmen-
tal control that acts to severely limit the exercise of those rights. 43 
The dockominium concept is, therefore, founded on a principle of 
exclusive occupation of water using the subdivision and conveyance 
of riparian rights as a legal vehicle. Such occupation of the water-
involving an ownership claim to water-necessarily implicates the 
public trust doctrine. 44 The public trust requires the government to 
oversee and protect public water resources. 45 The federal govern-
ment's trusteeship over the nation's navigable waters is exercised 
in part by the Corps through its section 10 regulatory program. 46 
The Corps' jurisdiction over structures placed in navigable waters 
operates in addition to state and local controls. Because no structure 
can lawfully be placed in a navigable waterway without federal 
approval, this Comment focuses only on the regulatory activity of 
the Corps. 
B. The Public Trust Doctrine 
The dockominium concept rests on the notion that the dockomi-
nium owners gain exclusive dominion and control of the water within 
their unit spaces. 47 Although most dockominium transactions are 
ERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS 219, 219-20 (J. McCord ed. 1969). "Land is the material of 
the earth ... and includes free or occupied space for an indefinite distance upwards as well 
as downwards, subject to limitations ... by law." CAL. CIVIL CODE § 659 (West 1982). 
43 See infra text accompanying notes 128-43. See also Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 
Cush.) 53, 94-95 (1851) (the intertidal zone between the low and high water marks is "subject 
to somewhat more restrictive regulations in its use, than interior and upland estate remote 
from places in which the public have a common right"). In Massachusetts, taking or deprivation 
by the legislature for the enhancement of navigation between the low and high water marks 
do not require compensation. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 
629, 644-46, 393 N.E.2d 356, 364-65 (1979). A regulation may deprive the riparian owner of 
a beneficial use without rendering the government act an unconstitutional taking. Lovequist 
v. Conservation Comm'n of Dennis, 379 Mass. 7, 19-20, 393 N.E.2d 858, 866 (1979). Thus, 
the Massachusetts legislature has the authority to make reasonable regulations affecting 
riparian rights for the purpose of protecting or enhancing the public's navigation and other 
rights at the shore. Alger, 61 Mass. at 95. 
44 The dockominium's concept of exclusive rights in the water conflicts with the public trust 
principle that the water is owned in trust by the government for the people. See infra notes 
128-43 and accompanying text. 
45 Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435, 452 (1892). 
46 Rivers and Harbors Appopriations Act of 1899 § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). Section 10 
provides the Corps jurisdiction over all waterway obstructions, which include the dockomi-
nium. 
47 Reis, NEW ORLEANS CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 193 ("Ownership of a condominium 
marina slip unit provides security of tenure."). 
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based upon no more than a conveyance of riparian rights, the scope 
of the concept constructively, if not actually, creates ownership in a 
fixed location of water.48 Such an ownership claim is inconsistent 
with the basic principles of the public trust doctrine. 
The common law public trust doctrine49 is premised on the concept 
that certain natural resources, such as waterways, shorelands, and 
the sea, are held in trust by the government for the common benefit 
of the public. 50 The doctrine is perceived to prevent the government 
from giving away rights to public lands and waters without ade-
quately "protecting the public interest. "51 In essence, certain public 
lands and waters are "inalienable. "52 Although a quantity of water 
from a running stream can be removed and possessed, the running 
stream itself cannot be privately owned. 53 The adoption of the public 
trust doctrine was predicated on the belief that private ownership 
of certain resources of a peculiarly public nature, valued for their 
importance to society, would be inappropriate. 54 This doctrine pro-
48 It may be argued that non-dockominium riparian owners may similarly claim ownership 
of the entire riparian waters as enclosed by the adjoining property boundaries. It is unlikely 
and unrealistic, however, that the riparian landowners will exercise their ownership by oc-
cupying the entire lot of their riparian waters. Moreover, the riparian rights doctrine protects 
riparian owners' access to and use of water, and does not even implicitly provide a right to 
the occupation of water. 
49 For a discussion of the American adoption of the English public trust doctrine, see Martin 
v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842); see also Board of Public Works of Maryland v. 
Larmar Corp., 262 Md. 24, 46, 277 A.2d 427,437 (1971). 
50 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387, 435 (1892); Carlson, The Public Trust and Urban Waterfront Development in Massachu-
setts: What is a Public Purpose?, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 71, 71 (1983); see also Comment, 
The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A Proposed Balancing Test, 23 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 211, 211 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Public Trust Test]. The public trust 
doctrine is also applicable to public air and land rights. See generally Comment, Condomi-
niums in Downtown Public Parking Lot Air Rights: A Creative City Planning Tool, 23 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 607 (1983). 
51 1 A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5-32 (2d ed. 1972); see also 1 W. RODGERS, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2.20(A) (1986). 
52 A. REITZE, supra note 51, at 5-32. 
53 1 HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 137, 141 
(Miscellaneous Publication No. 1206, U.S. Department of Agriculture 1974) (completed by 
H.H. Ellis and J.P. DeBraal); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*14 ("[T]here are some few things, which, ... must still unavoidably remain in common; being 
such wherein nothing but an usufructuary property is capable of being had . . . . Such . . . 
are the elements of light, air, and water . . . . "). 
54 Shively, 152 U.S. at 57. The Court held that: 
[l]ands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the manner 
of [uplands] .... They are of great value to the public for ... commerce, navigation 
and fishery. Their improvement by individuals, when permitted, is incidental or 
subordinate to the public use and right. Therefore the title and the control of them 
are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people. 
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vides the public with a right to the beneficial use of certain public 
resources, and this right necessarily supercedes any private 
interests55 and imposes strict responsibilities upon the government 
as trustee. 56 
The government, as the public trustee, cannot relinquish com-
pletely its trust duties associated with any public property. 57 Even 
when the government conveys away a trust property,58 it has not 
alienated its rights and duty to protect the public's interest in that 
property. 59 The private grantees in such instances are restricted to 
using the property only in a manner consistent with the proper usage 
of the protected resource. 60 Thus, grantees of submerged lands can-
not invade upland owners' riparian rights, including the right to an 
unobstructed view of the water body,61 the right to cross a beach to 
access the water,62 and the public trust rights of navigation and 
fishing.63 Such limitations64 act as a safeguard against improper gov-
Id. (emphasis added); see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 485 (1970). 
55 See, e.g., Kootenai Envt'l Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 105 Idaho 622, 631, 
671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (1983) ("The public trust doctrine takes precedent even over vested water 
rights."). 
56 Comment, Public Trust Test, supra note 50, at 211. 
57 See State v. Cleveland & Pittsburgh R.R., 94 Ohio St. 61,80, 113 N.E. 677, 682 (1916); 
Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892); see also THOMPSON, supra note 
25, § 258, at 309 (the government cannot fully discard its sovereign power and public obligation 
in the regulation of the waterways). 
58 See Commonwealth v. Boston Terminal Co., 185 Mass. 281,282-83, 70 N.E. 125, 125-26 
(1904) (the state legislature is endowed with the control of all public rights, and thus the 
ability to convey away public properties). 
59 Brickell v. Trammel, 77 Fla. 544, 559, 82 So. 221, 226 (1919); see Kootenai Envt'l, 105 
Idaho at 632, 671 P.2d at 1095 ("The public trust doctrine at all times forms the outer 
boundaries of permissible government action with respect to public trust resources."); Sax, 
supra note 54, at 486-87. 
60 Brickell, 77 Fla. at 559, 82 So. at 226; Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957) 
("the state may dispose of submerged lands under tidal waters to the extent that such 
disposition will not interfere with the public's right of navigation, swimming and like uses"). 
61 Hayes, 91 So. 2d at 799-800, 801. 
62Id. at 799. 
63 Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n of Biloxi, 199 So. 2d 627, 633 (Miss. 1967). 
64 A Florida statute authorizes a board to sell submerged lands to private individuals, but 
only after considering whether such a conveyance would interfere with marine, wildlife, 
fishing, and other environmental concerns. FLA. STA. ANN. § 253. 12(2)(a) (West 1975). The 
Florida Supreme Court, in validating the statute, announced "as settled that title to all 
submerged lands ... is held by the states in trust for all the people ... , that such trust is 
governmental and may not be completely alienated but that in the interest of all the people, 
the states may grant to individuals limited privileges or rights in such lands." Caples v. 
Taliaferro, 144 Fla. 1, 6, 197 So. 861, 863 (1940), motion to vacate and modify denied per 
curiam, 146 Fla. 122, 200 So. 378 (1941). 
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ernmental conveyances, and as an assurance that the conveyance 
will preserve the rights and interests of the public. 65 
This recognition of public rights in water can be traced back to 
the ancient Romans. 66 The Romans recognized that the banks of 
waterways, though owned by the owner of the attached upland, 
were public and available equally to all those who desired to moor 
their vessels.67 The ancient Roman rivers and ports and the sea and 
seashore were also available for public use. 68 This recognition of 
public rights in the water was later introduced to this continent in 
the Massachusetts colony.69 It is now known as the public trust 
doctrine. 
Application of the public trust doctrine is a matter of state common 
law. 70 The United States Supreme Court has held <;onsistently that 
all states received ownership of all lands under tidal waters and the 
water itself, unless relinquished by the state.71 In the 1842 case of 
Martin v. Waddell, the Supreme Court held that, upon the decla-
ration of the American revolution, "the people of each state became 
themselves sovereign; and in that character [held] the absolute right 
to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own 
common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the 
Constitution to the general government. "72 The American states thus 
65 Brickell, 77 Fla. at 559,82 So. at 226; see Sax, supra note 54, at 486-87. See, e.g., People 
v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 79-81, 360 N.E.2d 773, 780-81 (1976) (the granting of 
submerged lands for the private construction of a steel plant that will result in jobs and other 
economic advantages does not satisfy the public purpose essential for the state conveyance of 
trust land and resources). 
66 J. INST. 2.1.1 to 2.1.6; see Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Sub-
merged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-65 (1970). 
67 J. INST. 2.1.4. 
68 Id. 2.1.2, 2.1.5. 
69 The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony, Liberties Common, § 2 
(rev. 1672), reprinted in CITY COUNCIL OF BOSTON, THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHU-
SETTS, 90-91 (1887) (compiled by W.H. Whitmore, Record Commissioner of Boston); see 
Shively v. Bowlby, 52 U.S. 1, 18 (1894) (the ordinance is regarded as the Colonial Ordinance 
of 1641, although it was not passed until 1647). 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recognizes that the commonwealth holds title 
in the shoreland in trust for public uses; this recognition enjoys the support of legislative 
awareness. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 633, 393 N.E.2d 
356, 359 (1979) "Tide waters ... [are] for the common use like air and light .... " Id. (citing 
the Massachusetts Senate Joint Committee on Mercantile Affairs and Insurance, 1850 Sen. 
Doc. No. 119, at 2); see also Barker v. Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255 (1832); Commonwealth 
v. Boston Terminal Co., 185 Mass. 281, 283, 70 N.E. 125, 126 (1904). 
70 See, e.g., Shively, 152 U.S. at 26; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 
794, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 1760 (1988). 
71 Shively, 152 U.S. at 26; Phillips Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. at 794; Knight v. United States 
Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891). 
72 Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410, 413-14 (1842); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 
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gained ownership of the land, once "held by the king in his public 
and regal character as the representative of the nation, and in trust 
for them. "73 The American states also took from the English monarch 
the responsibility to hold and to protect the navigable waters and 
the submerged lands "for the benefit and advantage of the whole 
community. "74 
In 1892, the United States Supreme Court announced its seminal 
decision concerning the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Rail-
road v. Illinois. 75 In Illinois Central, the Illinois general assembly 
had passed the "Lake Front" Act in 1869,76 which granted one thou-
sand acres of the bed of Lake Michigan, constituting the entire 
harbor of the City of Chicago, to a railroad company.77 The state 
legislature, however, passed legislation in 1873 repealing the 1869 
act, extinguishing the railroad's interest. 78 In finding the 1873 act 
valid,79 the Court declared the State of Illinois to be the owner in 
(4 Otto) 324, 336 (1876) ("In this country, as a general thing, all waters are deemed navigable 
which are really so .... "). 
Currently, federal regulations recognize that "[n]avigable waters of the United States are 
those waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or 
have been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign 
commerce." 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1987). However, the regulations concede that "navigable 
waters" are Ultimately dependent on judicial interpretation. [d. § 329.3. 
73 Martin, 41 U.S. at 409. 
74 [d. at 411. One law review article expressed the opinion that the "adoption of the public 
trust doctrine fit the needs of a growing democratic nation which sought to develop its economic 
resources by broadening individual opportunities." Comment, Ownership Rights to Submerged 
and Formerly Submerged Land in New Jersey, 91 DICK. L. REV. 833, 837 (Spring 1987). 
That view espouses the theory that public ownership of the water would create equal access 
and opportunity. To facilitate the commercial and population expansion in this country's 
developing period, some jurisdictions opted to expand the riparian rights of private individuals. 
See, e.g., Board of Public Works v. Larmar Corp., 262 Md. 24, 37, 277 A.2d 427, 432-33 
(1971). 
76 Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see generally Sax, supra note 54, at 
489-91. 
76 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 432. 
77 [d. at 438. 
78 [d. at 463-64. 
79 The Court recognized that the 1869 act gave the railroad dominion over the bed and 
waters of the harbor, subject in part to the mere limitation that obstructions cannot be placed 
in the harbor to impair the public right to navigation. [d. at 451. The 1869 act granted only 
additional powers and privileges to the railroad for which the company paid nothing. [d. at 
461. The only consideration consisted of possible future payments of a certain per centum of 
the gross proceeds, receipts, and incomes which the company might derive from the property 
granted under the 1869 act. [d. The Court noted that the 1869 act did not bind the company 
to use the granted property to produce income; therefore, the company conceivably did not 
have to pay any proceeds to the state. [d. The Court likened the 1869 act to a license that 
rendered the company as an agent of the state to improve the waterfront property, and under 
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fee simple of the submerged lands and water that the 1869 act had 
attempted to convey.80 The Court stated that it is settled law that 
the states have sovereignty and control, under a trust arrangement, 
of lands covered by navigable waters, as well as of the water itself. 81 
The Illinois legislature in 1869 had breached its trust duties by 
conveying the whole Chicago harbor. 82 
The public trust doctrine dictates generally the extent of public 
and private rights in navigable resources. 83 To that end, the states 
hold title to water and submerged lands. 84 Most states85 limit private 
ownership of riparian property to the high water mark. 86 In these 
that arrangement, the state had the unquestionable right to enact the 1873 act to cancel the 
agency and revoke the company's powers. Id. at 461-62. 
80 I d. at 463. 
81 Id. at 435, 452; see also United States v. Kane, 602 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1979). 
82 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452-54. 
83 Each state determines for itself who holds title to the beds of a waterway, and to what 
extent that title will be. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 324, 338 (1876); Shively v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894); see State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 66, 148 N.W. 617, 619, 
reh'g denied per curiam, 127 Minn. 77, 148 N.W. 1095 (1914). 
See supra text accompanying notes 49-65. In addition to the public trust doctrine, the 
navigational servitude also impacts upon private riparian interests. The federal government 
holds a navigational servitude easement for the benefit of the public, which is a paramount 
interest affecting all holders of riparian and riverbed interests. Montana v. United States, 
450 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1981); United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 107 S. Ct. 1487, 
1491-92 (1987). This dominant servitude stems from a power to regulate navigation, which 
extends to the body of the watercourse and the bed below the ordinary high water mark. 
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967). 
84 See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212,229 (1845) ("The shores of navigable 
waters, and soils under them ... were reserved to the states respectively."). The Congress 
later codified the states' title to navigable waters by the enactment of the Submerged Lands 
Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1986). The Supreme Court has opined that the Act merely 
confirmed the states' pre-existing rights, and that the Congress merely quitclaimed all federal 
claims to the navigable waters. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 318 (1973). 
85 E.g., Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 303, 
177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. at 336 (concerning Iowa); State v. 
Superior Court of Lake County, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 222, 625 P.2d 239, 246, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 
703 (1981); Simons v. French, 25 Conn. 345, 351 (1856); Parker v. West Coast Packing Co., 
17 Or. 510, 515, 21 P. 822, 823 (1889); In Re Sanborn, 57 Haw. 585, 588-91, 562 P.2d 771, 
773-75 (1977); McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa (Cole's Ed.) 1 (1856) (analysis of the limits of 
public ownership along the Mississippi River); Ross v. Mayor of Edgewater, 115 N.J.L. 477, 
483, 180 A. 866, 870 (1935), aiI'd per curiam, 116 N.J.L. 447, 184 A. 810, cert. denied, 299 
U.S. 543 (1936); Newark v. Natural Resource Council, 82 N.J. 530, 543, 414 A.2d 1304, 1310 
(1980); Brower v. Wakeman, 88 Conn. 8, 11 (1914); Short Beach Cottage Owners Improvement 
Ass'n v. Stratford, 154 Conn. 194, 200, 224 A.2d 532, 535 (1966). 
86 "High water mark" is defined as "the line on the shore to which high tide rises under 
normal weather conditions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 656 (5th ed. 1979). See In Re Min-
netonka Lake Improvement, 56 Minn. 513, 521-22, 58 N.W. 295, 297 (1894). This boundary 
mark is computed generally as a mean high tide, and not as the extreme height of the water." 
Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. at 303, 177 S.E.2d at 516. However, for purposes of fresh water 
rivers and lakes, which are typically nontidal, the high water mark is to be determined by 
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states, land seaward of the high water mark is subject to the public 
trust doctrine. Other states limit private ownership to the low water 
mark. 87 In the low water mark jurisdictions, the owners hold to the 
low water mark, but the title to the beach area between the high 
and low water marks is also subject to the public trust doctrine. 
Also, in the low water mark jurisdictions, the upland property and 
the tidal fiats may be conveyed away separately.88 Nevertheless, the 
riparian owner does not own the water. The public trust imposes a 
superior public right to free access of the intertidal zone for the 
purposes of recreation, fishing, navigation, hunting, and other activ-
ities, depending on the state's common law. Some states recognize 
more public rights than do other states.89 
examining the bed and banks for the presence of an ordinary and continued mark upon the 
soil which displays a distinct character in respect to the vegetation and the nature of the soil. 
Minnetonka Lake, 56 Minn. at 522,58 N.W. at 297. 
87 In the states that follow a low water mark rule, private riparian land owners hold title 
to the low water mark, but such title is qualified by a public trust doctrine that recognizes 
certain public uses, such as fishing and navigation, in the zone between the high and low 
water marks. Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 437 (1810); Montgomery v. Reed, 69 Me. 510, 
514 (1879); Lapish v. Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 92 (1831); Schumeier v. The St. Paul & Pacific 
R.R., 10 Gilfillan 59 (10 Minn. 82), 77 (1865); State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 69,148 N.W. 617, 
620-21, reh'g denied per curiam, 127 Minn. 77, 148 N.W. 1095 (1914); Union Depot, St. Ry. 
& Transfer Co. of Stillwater v. Brunswick, 31 Minn. 297, 301, 17 N.W. 626, 628-29 (1883); 
Johnson v. Rost, 164 Minn. 154, 158,204 N.W. 642, 643 (1925); Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 
159, 165 n.5, 100 N.W.2d 689, 694 n.5 (1960); Hazen v. Perkins, 92 Vt. 414, 419, 105 A. 249, 
251 (1918) (Vermont riparian properties bounding on public waters extend to the "water's 
edge, or to [the] low water mark if there be a definite low water mark line"); Fletcher v. 
Phelps, 28 Vt. 257, 262 (1856); Lahey, Waterfront Development and the Public Trust Doctrine, 
70 MASS. L. REV 55, 56, 56 n. 12. 
The low water mark boundary developed from the presumption that the early settlers 
required access to the sea by wharfage for purposes of commerce, and could not effectively 
do so without building out onto the shore bed waterward of the high water mark. Common-
wealth v. Alger 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 77 (1851) ("to induce persons to erect wharves below 
high water mark, which were necessary to the purposes of commerce, the common law of 
England was altered by an ordinance providing that the [riparian] proprietor ... shall hold 
to low water mark, where the tide does not ebb and flow more than one hundred rods") 
(opinion was not delivered until 1853). The legal principle of using a water mark as a property 
boundary does not change whether the waterway is fresh or salt water. See Lapish, 8 Me. at 
93. 
"Low water mark" is defined as the "[l]ine on the shore marking the lowest ebb of the tide." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 854 (5th ed. 1979). 
88 Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. at 437; Deering v. Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 64-65 (1845). 
Compare Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 686, 154 N.W.2d 473, 483 (1967) (''We hold that 
riparian rights are not alienable, severable, divisible, or assignable apart from the [riparian] 
land .... "). 
89 See, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1117-18 (Alaska 1988) (tidelands 
are subject to "continuing public easements for public purposes of navigation, commerce, and 
fishery"); State v. Knowles-Lombard Co., 122 Conn. 263, 267, 188 A. 275, 276 (1936) (public 
rights of fishing, boating, hunting, bathing, and passing and repassing); Butler v. Attorney 
-
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In all jurisdictions, the public trust doctrine requires that state 
actions concerning the state's portion of the shore must be consistent 
with the public interest. 9o The public interest requires that the state 
not sell the tidelands or the fiats, or control their usage except to 
increase the facilities for navigation and commerce. 91 Thus, the public 
trust doctrine is recognized as imposing a duty upon the government 
to hold the waters in trust for the people to use. 92 This trust is in 
keeping with the notion that water, being a vital and uncultivable 
resource, should be free of the monopolizing effect of private own-
ership.93 Waterfront or riparian owners have a superior right to 
access and to use the water, but they cannot own the water adjacent 
to their property.94 Waterfront or riparian owners, therefore, cannot 
own the water adjacent to their property, but do have a superior 
right to access and to use the water. This right accompanies own-
ership of the riparian parcel. 
C. The Riparian Rights Doctrine 
The riparian rights doctrine95 was developed to formalize the 
terms for water use between land owners along a body of 
General, 195 Mass. 79, 82-84, 80 N.E. 688, 688-89 (1907) (public rights of fishing, fowling, 
and navigation, but not bathing); Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 510 (Me. 1986) (public 
rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 
N.J. 306, 321-22, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (public rights of navigation, fishing, and recreation, 
including bathing, swimming, and other shore activities), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). 
90 See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 352-53 (1892) (states possess police 
power to regulate waterways for benefit of the public, and state abdication of ownership of 
trust resources must be consistent with the public trust). The Vermont bed or soil of "boatable" 
lakes is held by the state in trust for the public to use. Hazen, 92 Vt. at 419, 105 A. at 251. 
In Massachusetts, the fee in the land under tide waters has remained in the government, held 
in trust for public use, except as affected by the Colonial Ordinance and by private grants. 
Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 426, 89 N.E. 124, 125 (1909); see 
also note 69. 
91 See Parker v. West Coast Packing Co., 17 Or. 510, 515-16, 21 P. 822,824 (1889). Oregon, 
however, cannot sell the fiats, nor control the usage except to increase the facilities for 
navigation and commerce. Jd.; see Sax, supra note 54, at 477. 
92 Under the public trust doctrine, the state may exercise police power over the property, 
for the good of the people. Home for Aged Women, 202 Mass. at 434--35,89 N.E. at 129. 
93 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). 
94 Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435, 445-46 (1892). 
95 Riparian rights are associated with property adjacent to a river or stream, while littoral 
rights are associated with property on the shore of seas or great lakes. The legal distinction 
between the two rights is almost immaterial because the common law applicable to each is 
virtually identical, having developed largely through riparian cases. See CRIB BET, supra note 
20, at 310; THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 259, at 311. The United States, under the leadership 
of Justices Kent and Story, was the first nation to develop the doctrine of riparian rights. 
CRIBBET, supra note 20, at 298; see THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 255, at 290. Justice Story 
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water.96 In the eastern states,97 riparian rights developed amidst a 
society strong in European legal traditions and located in a climate 
generous with rainfall. 98 This doctrine is based on the right to use 
and enjoy land that contains, overlies, or abuts a natural water-
course. 99 The common law of the states100 guided the development 
of riparian rights and required the riparian owner to make reason-
able use of the water resource,101 to share the use of the water with 
first set out the rights of riparian proprietors, both individually and collectively, in Tyler v. 
Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (D. R.1. 1827) (No. 14,312) (Story, Circuit Justice). Justice Story's 
opinion in Tyler provided the principles, rights, and responsibilities of the doctrine as it 
related to the flow of water. For a discussion of the differing views on the historical roots of 
the riparian rights doctrine, see 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 610 (Clark ed. 1976 and 
Supp. 1978) [hereinafter WATER RIGHTS]. 
96 United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 504-05 (1945) (the riparian rights 
doctrine "was evolved to settle conflicts" between riparian owners); see CRIB BET, supra note 
20, at 299. 
!Y7 The development of water use doctrines is divided geographically between the eastern 
and western, or Atlantic and Pacific, water states. See CRIBBET, supra note 20, at 298; 1 
HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 180. The fundamental distinction between the states' treatment 
of water use is that the East has adopted a riparian rights doctrine, while the West has 
adopted a prior appropriation doctrine. CRIB BET, supra note 20, at 298. In the western states, 
the doctrine of prior appropriation developed from a notion of "first come, first served," where 
prior use gave a superior right. Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, in WATER RESOURCES 
AND THE LAW 161 (Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan Law School 1958). 
Appropriative rights, unlike riparian rights, do not depend upon rights in the land. 5 R.R. 
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ~ 708(2)(c) (1986). This doctrine was built basically on 
a foundation of necessity and common practice. Lauer, supra, at 162; see also Clark v. Nash, 
198 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1905). The doctrine of prior appropriation advances three principles: 
priority of claim gives priority of right; use must be for a beneficial purpose; and a failure to 
exercise the right forfeits the right. 5 POWELL, supra, ~ 708(2)(b). Western states resorted 
to an appropriation doctrine to maintain the highest beneficial use while meeting the exigencies 
resulting from the short supply of and increasing demands for water. See, e.g., Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy Dist. v. Gailey, 8 Utah 2d 55,58-59,328 P.2d 175, 177,judgment modified 
and a/I'd, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958); see also Lauer, supra, at 161 ("New water rights 
become impossible to acquire; existing rights are seldom prone to change hands, and the 
purpose for which they are employed is almost never changed"). This view of the disbursement 
of water centers on the doctrine's design to prevent waste in those western states. See 
TECLAFF, supra note 14, at 278. This Comment will not address the doctrine of prior appro-
priations as affected by dockominiums, but will only consider the dockominiums' impact on 
the doctrine of riparian rights. 
98 5 POWELL, supra note 97, ~ 708(2)(a). 
99 [d.; see CRIBBET, supra note 20, at 308-10. It is generally assumed that to enjoy riparian 
land is to also enjoy the use of the water. The former cannot occur if the latter is restricted. 
100 The United States Supreme Court defers the regulation of private usage of the shores 
to the sovereign control of each state. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,40, 58 (1894) (providing 
an expansive survey of most jurisdictions concerning the division of the public trust and the 
private proprietary interest at the shoreline boundary). 
101 Most states have adopted the common law rule of reasonable use, which protects gen-
erally the water's rate of flow, quantity, and quality. 5 POWELL, supra note 97, ~ 709(2)(b)(iii). 
See, e.g., Weare v. Chase, 93 Me. 264, 269, 44 A. 900, 902 (1899) ("[L]ow riparian proprietors 
-
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all other riparian owners, and to exercise such use without harming 
other riparian owners.102 All riparian proprietors on a watercourse 
have equal rights to water use, and the doctrine insists that each 
owner use the water without impairing the quality of water available 
to other riparian owners along the same stretch of water. 103 Riparian 
rights, thus, are simply use privileges and responsibilities arising 
from coastal and shore landownership. 
Central to the riparian rights concept is the premise that no water 
right exists without landownership.104 The source of the riparian 
right is found in and defined in terms of the riparian upland. 105 
Landowners obtain riparian rights as part of the transaction by 
which they acquire title to the land. 106 The right runs with the land 
and cannot be lost through nonuse. 107 Through ownership of an in-
terest in the upland, riparian owners can inhibit the public's use of 
... [are] entitled to the reasonable use and enjoyment of the water ... and to the natural 
flow of the stream, without obstruction and without diminution, subject only to the reasonable 
and proper use or detention by the proprietors above."); Mason v. Whitney, 193 Mass. 152, 
158, 78 N.E. 881, 884 (1906) ("The primary right of every riparian proprietor is to have the 
natural and customary flow of the stream, without obstruction or change."); Meridian, Ltd. 
v. San Francisco, 13 Cal. 2d 424, 445, 90 P.2d 537, 547, reh'g denied per curiam, 91 P.2d 105 
(1939); Snyder v. Callaghan, 284 S.E.2d 241, 246 (W. Va. 1981); Little Rock & Fort Smith 
Ry. v. Chapman, 39 Ark. 463, 473-74 (1882) (no one can obstruct or change a water course in 
a manner injurious to the riparian owner); Boyd v. Greene County, 7 Ark. App. 1l0, 112, 644 
S.W.2d 615,616-17 (1983); see Lauer, supra note 97, at 163. 
102 5 POWELL, supra note 97, ~ 708(2)(a); 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 
*439 (every riparian owner "has naturally an equal right to the use of the water which flows 
in the stream adjacent to his lands"); THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 264, at 365. Riparian rights 
concerning usage of the water are classified into two purposes: natural and artificial. Thompson 
v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 686, 154 N.W.2d 473,483-84 (1967). Drinking and household uses are 
regarded as natural uses that enjoy a preferential status. Id. at 686-87, 154 N.W.2d at 483. 
Commercial and recreational uses, however, are considered as artificial uses that must satisfy 
a test for reasonableness. Id., 154 N.W.2d at 484. 
103 CRIBBET, supra note 20, at 299. Justice Story noted that "no [riparian] proprietor has a 
right to use the water to the prejudice of another." Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 
(D. R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) (Story, Circuit Justice); see TECLAFF, supra note 14, at 277. 
104 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 95, § 4.3; see Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387, 445 (1892). 
105 Belvedere Dev. v. Department of Transp. , 476 So. 2d 649,652 (Fla. 1985); see THOMPSON, 
supra note 25, § 264, at 361 (riparian rights arise as an incident to the upland, not as an 
incident to the submerged land). A tract of land not previously serviced with water, severed 
from a larger tract of riparian property, would be cut off from the riparian right of the original 
lot. See Murphy Slough Ass'n v. Avila, 27 Cal. App. 3d 649,657-58, 104 Cal. Rptr. 136, 142-
43 (1972). 
106 2 HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 22; see Mianus Realty Co. v. Greenway, 151 Conn. 128, 
131, 193 A.2d 713, 715 (1963) (owners of upland property bounded by the high water mark 
are presumed to possess riparian rights, :ncluding the right to wharf out). 
107 5 POWELL, supra note 97, ~ 708(2)(a). 
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navigable waters by restricting access to the shores. 108 They cannot, 
however, exclude the public from the navigable waters. 109 
Riparian rights are of vague physical proportions. llO The riparian 
rights provide access to the water fronting the upland property. In 
virtually all situations, a property deed describes the finite bound-
aries of the upland parcel. The accompanying riparian rights, how-
ever, lack such physical delineations. 111 The natural crookedness of 
riverbanks and shorelines creates difficulties in determining how the 
riparian boundary should extend seaward. Riparian rights originated 
with the belief that all riparian owners should have equal and com-
munal roles in the use of a common waterway. 112 The rights and 
responsibilities operated in the hopes of ensuring continued free 
access to the water. The dockominium, however, operates to dero-
gate that belief by imposing finite boundaries on riparian ownership. 
Riparian owners acquire at most the usufructuary1l3 right to water 
based on possession or dominion, but not outright ownership of the 
water. 114 The riparian owner has the right to erect piers and docks 
to facilitate use of the water, although the right is subject to gov-
ernmental regulation. 115 Public policy discourages the privatization 
of watercourses because water, being vital to the existence of life, 
should remain available for all persons to use. 116 Thus, no riparian 
proprietor owns water in a stream; the riparian proprietor has only 
the right to the reasonable use of the water. 117 A free-flowing wa-
108 TECLAFF, supra note 14, at 277; see THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 274, at 454. 
109 TECLAFF, supra note 14, at 277; see THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 274, at 454. 
110 See Reis, NEW ORLEANS CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 198. 
III See id. Riparian rights are met with two sure boundaries. The riparian ownership extends 
seaward but to the point declared as navigable either by public authority or by judicial decision. 
Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 446-47 (1892). The second boundary is where 
the upland meets the water. 
112 See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (D. R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) (Story, Circuit Justice). 
113 A "usufruct" is "the right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits of an estate .... " 
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2524 (unabridged 1981). 
114 Lauer, supra note 97, at 160. 
115 United States v. 222.0 Acres of Land, 306 F. Supp. 138, 151 (D. Md. 1969) (to facilitate 
the right of access to the water, the riparian owner may erect piers on the submerged land, 
subject to governmental regulations with regard to the public and the adjoining riparian 
owners); see Mutual Chern. Co. of America v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 33 F. Supp. 
881, 883 (D. Md. 1940) (the riparian owners are vested with the right to erect piers in the 
water fronting their riparian properties), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Mayor & 
City Council of Baltimore v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 122 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1941); see also 
infra notes 144-54 and accompanying text. 
116 Lauer, supra note 97, at 161; 3 KENT, supra note 102, at *440 ("Streams of water are 
intended for the use and comfort of man .... "). 
117 Williams v. Rankin, 245 Cal. App. 2d 803, 818-19, 54 Cal. Rptr. 184, 194 (1966); see Sax, 
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tercourse, resembling more an animal ferae naturae118 than an object 
of property, cannot be owned outright by a private individual. 119 
Denial of private ownership in the water, however, does not prohibit 
the exercise of "valid private rights to capture, possess, and bene-
ficially use the public waters."120 
Although water may not be owned, the riparian right to use water 
is still regarded as a valuable property interest. 121 Such recognition 
is unsurprising because riparian owners can gain lawful access to 
the watercourse,122 and because riparian owners can effectively deny 
the public such access. 123 This right to access can be exploited for 
commercial, fishing, recreational, or aesthetic purposes. In that 
light, riparian rights are significant property interests, because of 
the potential economic benefits that they may involve. 124 
Courts have noted that riparian rights are alienable from the 
adjoining upland property.125 Thus, such rights are property that 
supra note 54, at 485 (people own at most a usufruct in the water, but not the water itself); 
3 KENT, supra note 102, at *439 (The riparian owner "has no property in the water itself, 
but a simple usufruct while it passes along."). 
118 "Ferae naturae" is defined as "Of a wild nature or disposition. Animals which are by 
nature wild are so designated, by way of distinction from such as are naturally tame, the 
latter being called 'domitae naturae.''' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 558 (5th ed. 1979). 
119 Lauer, supra note 97, at 131, 159-60. The riparian right "to the flow of a natural 
watercourse is not an ownership of the corpus of the flowing water." 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 
53, at 151 (italics original); see THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 261, at 318-20. Its ever-changing 
flow of water prevents it from being declared a private property interest. Lauer, supra note 
97, at 160. 
120 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 14l. 
121 See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 445-46 (1892); Yates v. Milwau-
kee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1870); Union Depot, St. Ry. & Transfer Co. of Stillwater v. 
Brunswick, 31 Minn. 297, 301, 17 N.W. 626, 628-29 (1883); Snyder v. Callaghan, 284 S.E.2d 
241, 246 (w. Va. 1981) (the riparian owner has a property interest in the natural flow of the 
riparian watercourse); Braswell v. Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 508, 511, 108 S.E.2d 912, 915 
(1959) ("the right to have water flow in the direction provided by nature is a property right"); 
Hanford v. St. Paul & Duluth R.R., 43 Minn. 104,42 N.W. 596 (1889), aii'd after reargument, 
43 Minn. 110, 119, 44 N.W. 1144, 1148 (1890) (the "quality of alienability should be deemed 
to belong" to the riparian right, as it does also to all other forms of property in general). See 
also Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Associates, 512 
So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987); see 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 154-55. The riparian right is 
regarded as part and parcel of the land itself. 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 53, at 156; THOMPSON, 
supra note 25, § 261, at 326. 
122 Lauer, supra note 97, at 163. 
123 Persons not the riparian owner must gain permission from the owner, or else commit 
trespass, in efforts to access the watercourse. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS 357 (4th ed. 1971). 
124 The means of deriving economic benefits from riparian rights are numerous: the rights 
to a direct view of the water may increase a home's value; the rights may be used for the 
establishment of fishing and maritime businesses; the rights may be used for recreational or 
agricultural purposes; and the rights may be sold or leased to others. 
125 This riparian right is, like other property, alienable by the owner. Simons v. French, 25 
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may be a subject of a contractual or conveyance instrument. Land 
owners in possession of such riparian rights are generally at liberty 
to sell the land and retain the rights, or vice versa. Moreover, the 
land owner may opt to share the riparian rights with other individ-
uals. The ownership arrangement of the riparian land and the ripar-
ian rights is generally without any restrictions as long as the land 
tract is physically in contact with the waterway.126 Regardless of 
who may own the riparian rights, however, all riparian rights are 
subordinate to the paramount rights of the pUblic. 127 
Riparian owners, regardless of the ownership arrangement, hold 
their interest in navigable waters subject to the federal govern-
ment's paramount power to control and regulate the navigable 
waters for commerce purposes. 128 When the flats129 are covered by 
water, or are not enclosed sufficiently to exercise exclusion, the 
public has the right to enter the submerged area for ordinary pur-
poses of navigation. 130 The riparian owner merely possesses the 
riparian right of wharfage, 131 and the right to access and take water, 
to be exercised consistent with the rights of the public and the 
Conn. 346, 352 (1856). The underlying principle is that it is immaterial who owns the riparian 
wharfage rights, because the public in all cases is secured in its right of navigation and 
commerce. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that the flats may be alienated from 
the upland because neither public policy nor geographical peculiarities demand the prohibition 
of such an alienation. Id. at 354. Therefore, "the riparian rights to wharf out, erect bulkheads 
and fill in front of the land may lawfully and effectively be severed from the land .... " 
Williams v. Skyline Dev. Corp., 265 Md. 130, 155-56,288 A.2d 333,348 (1972). 
126 Although the use of the water may be conveyed away separate from the upland, the 
riparian rights are never severed from the riparian land. See 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 
95, § 53.4, at 356 ("The riparian hereditament is incident to the land and passes with it by 
conveyance. For the same reason, it is not severable from the land, although the right to the 
use of the water may be conveyed .... "). But see THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 262, at 327 
("Riparian rights may be alienated separately from the ownership of the uplands."). See also 
Butier, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the Re-
lationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 95, 137 (1985) (riparian 
rights should be transferable); supra text accompanying note 105. 
127 See Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 548, 15 N.W.2d 174, 180-81 (1944); Skyline 
Development Corp., 265 Md. at 155, 288 A.2d at 348; supra notes 54-60. 
128 Carolina Beach Fishing Pier v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 301, 177 S.E.2d 
513, 515 (1970) (the federal government may regulate navigable waters under authority of the 
commerce clause); Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 165 n.5, 100 N.W.2d 689,694 n.5 (1960) 
(riparian rights are subject to state regulation for public purposes such as navigation). 
129 The flats (Le., shore, tidelands, foreshore) are the stretch of land bounded by the low 
and high water marks, alternately covered by water and bare. Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 
435, 439-40 (1810). 
130 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 74-75 (1851); see also Austin v. Carter, 
1 Mass. 231, 231 (1804). 
131 See supra note 115. The United States Supreme Court regards the wharfage right as a 
franchise. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,20 (1894); see also THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 264, 
at 362. 
\ 
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adjoining riparian owners.132 Thus, ownership of riparian rights, 
unlike that of land, is met with strict doctrinal regulations and 
restrictions. 133 Indeed, the dockominium, as a waterway structure, 
is regulated by the Corps under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act. 
Riparian property is, and has always been, subject to a dom-
inant servitude. 134 The federal exercise of claiming a watercourse 
for the purposes of the navigational servitude,135 by proper 
132 Parker v. West Coast Packing Co., 17 Or. 510, 515, 21 P. 822, 824 (1889). Thus, water 
rights, including the rights associated with water usage and water flow, as held by riparian 
land owners, are not absolute against the world. United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 
499, 510 (1945). Government actions in navigable waterways, where boating activities are 
most likely to take place, will not necessarily require compensation, although they may have 
an adverse impact on the rights of individual riparian owners. [d. at 507-10. For example, 
navigation improvement measures that increase the water level, and reduce an individual's 
dry land area, will not cause courts to find for compensation. [d. at 510 (government dam in 
navigable river raised water level by three feet); Crocker v. Champlin, 202 Mass. 437, 440-
42, 89 N.E. 129, 130-31 (1909) (state dam in navigable river submerged gravel pit in eight 
feet of water). Also, legislation that fixes a harborline through private tidelands to prevent 
full use of the submerged land does not require compensation. Alger, 61 Mass. at 104. Because 
Massachusetts recognizes private ownership to the low water mark, the Alger land owner 
was prevented from building a pier along the full expanse of the private tidelands. Recently, 
the Supreme Court held that even tide lands under non-navigable water, but influenced by 
the ebb and flow of the tide, are subject to the public trust doctrine. See generally Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 1760 (1988). It is, 
therefore, clear that the authority of the government to conduct activities in navigable waters, 
for the sake of navigational preservation or improvement, is superior to any contrary private 
interest. 
133 A property owner's right to reasonable private use is "subject to the rights and interests 
of the public in the navigable and other waters of the United States, including the federal 
navigation servitude and federal regulation for environmental protection." 33 C.F.R. 
§ 320.4(g)(1) (1987). The rights and use of the property at the shore are subject to the state's 
police power. Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 435, 89 N.E. 124, 
129 (1909). 
134 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1979); United States v. Commodore 
Park, 324 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1945); Willow River Co., 324 U.S. at 507-11; United States v. 
412.715 Acres of Land, 53 F. Supp. 143, 148-49 (N.D. Cal. 1943), judgment amended, 60 F. 
Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1945). 
135 Lauer, supra note 97, at 138-39. Where there is an issue of taking involving navigable 
waters and lands submerged below such waters, a statute asserts that the "United States 
retains all its navigable servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control of said 
lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce [and other activities] 
.... " 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1982). Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 
199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971), held that the "waters and underlying 
land are subject to the paramount servitude in the Federal government which the Submerged 
Lands Act [43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1982)] expressly reserved as an incident of power incident 
to the Commerce Clause." Zabel, 430 F.2d at 215. The Zabel court found no governmental 
taking associated with the government's denial of a permit to the plaintiff to dredge and fill 
plaintiff's eleven acres of tidelands for use as a commercial mobile trailer park. [d. at 215. 
The United States Supreme Court in 1978 subsequently rejected the similar argument that 
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legislation,136 is not a taking of property from riparian owners within 
the meaning of the fifth amendment. 137 The interests of riparian 
owners have always been subject to this dominant federal power, 
regardless of whether that power has been exercised affirmatively 
or has been permitted to lie dormant. 138 Under the authority of the 
navigation servitude, the government can control, improve, and reg-
ulate the navigability of waterways for the benefit of the navigating 
public,139 and may do so without compensating the owners of prop-
erty subject to the servitude. 140 Because water rights do not enjoy 
the legal status of other properties, such as real estate,141 the dock-
property owners "may establish a 'taking' simply by showing that they have been denied the 
ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for 
development .... " Penn Central Transp. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). Recently, 
however, the Supreme Court invoked the fifth amendment's due process clause to secure 
compensation for a temporary taking that denied a church use of its property in a manner no 
different from a permanent taking. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2386-87 (1987); see also San Diego Gas & Electric 
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in the Just 
Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable. "). The First 
English Court held that a local ordinance operated to deprive the landowner church of the 
free use of its property. 107 S. Ct. at 2389; see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 415 (1922) ("The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."). 
136 See Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249-52 
(1954) (a statute must make an "express assertion" of the government's paramount right to 
use water to the exclusion of existing users). 
137 THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 258, at 310 (the exercise of navigational servitude is not a 
taking); see supra note 135 for a brief discussion of some takings cases. The United States 
Supreme Court recently found a California regulation that conditioned permission to rebuild 
a beach house upon the owner's transfer of a public easement across the beach property would 
operate as a taking requiring just compensation. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. 
Ct. 3141, 3143-46 (1987). 
The federal Constitution requires that governments not deprive a person of property without 
due process of law or just compensation. U.S. CONST., amend. V. Amendment XIV, § 1 to 
the U.S. Constitution applies the due process taking rules to the states. See Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (due process of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment requires just compensation when private property is taken). See also 
Lauer, supra note 97, at 137 & nn.11-14. 
138 See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967). 
139 United States v. 412.715 Acres of Land, 53 F. Supp. 143, 148 (N.D. Cal. 1943), judgment 
amended, 60 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1945); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 
104 (1851); Crocker v. Champlin, 202 Mass. 437, 440-42, 89 N.E. 129, 130-31 (1909). 
140 Zabel, 430 F.2d at 215; 412.715 Acres of Land, 53 F. Supp. at 148 (The government "may 
deepen channels, widen streams, erect lighthouses, build bridges, construct dams, and make 
similar improvements, without compensating the owners of land subject to the navigation 
servitude. "). 
141 United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945); see Boston Waterfront 
Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 649, 392 N.E.2d 356,367 (1979) (private 
submerged land is not held in fee simple absolute). 
Not only is the exercise of water rights vulnerable to government intervention, but private 
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ominium's claims of property and water rights are highly susceptible 
to government intervention as permitted by the commerce clause. 
Whether governmental action in the form of denials of section 10 
permits mayor may not require just compensation appears to be a 
premature question, because the dockominium concept's reliance on 
vested property interests in the boat slip space runs counter to the 
accepted notion that ultimate ownership in water is public. 142 The 
dockominium concept is best portrayed as one derived from riparian 
rights as facilitated by condominium laws. Riparian rights are carved 
out neatly for separate ownership, made possible by condominium 
laws in most states. The purchasers become the riparian owners of 
the individual parcels of riparian rights, and they hope to moor their 
boats in that space. Understandably, such owners expect that no 
other boater, or even a swimmer, could occupy the unit slip space. 
This expectation suggests that the dockominium owner owns the 
water within the slip space. The public trust doctrine, however, 
asserts that public waters are held by the public to facilitate equal 
access for all people. Thus, although dockominium owners possess 
preferred water privileges by virtue of riparian ownership, they 
must exercise such rights in conformity with the public trust.143 In 
light of the public trust implications involved in the dockominium 
concept, the Corps must factor in the dockominium's adverse impacts 
upon the public's interest when it reviews section 10 applications to 
permit dockominium facilities. 
D. Federal Regulatory Controls of Dockominiums 
The Corps derives its authority to regulate the dockominium, and 
all other structures placed in navigable waters, from section 10 of 
expectations in property interests at the shore may also be in jeopardy. Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791, 798, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 1760 (1988). The dockominium 
owner asserts a property claim to the exercise of water rights. Both the claim of property 
and the water rights are highly susceptible to government intervention. The Supreme Court 
has opined that, for the purposes of a fifth amendment taking, not all economic interests are 
property rights. Willow River, 324 U.S. at 502. "Economic advantages" at the shore cannot 
be recognized as compensable rights unless they are supported by law. Id. The dockominium 
is a novel economic use of riparian ownership that cannot claim the full force of legal support. 
Water rights do not enjoy the legal status of other properties, such as real estate. Id. at 510; 
see Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 649, 392 N.E.2d 
356, 367 (1979) (private submerged land is not held in fee simple absolute). Therefore, dock-
ominiums have yet to gain the legal recognition and support of any law, whether legislative 
or common, to defend against any legitimate government intervention. 
142 Private vested rights in government properties generally concern licenses in mining 
properties. See Laitos. & Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public 
Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1987). 
143 See Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900). 
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the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899. 144 Until 1968, 
the primary thrust of the Corps' regulatory program was the pro-
tection of navigation. 145 Since then, an ancillary objective of the 
Corps' program has been to protect the water resources of the 
United States. 146 As a result of regulations promulgated in 1968, the 
program serves this purpose through a "public interest review"147 
that "balanc[es] the favorable impacts [of work in navigable water] 
against the detrimental impacts. "148 
An application submitted to the Corps for a permit to approve 
dockominium facilities will trigger the public interest review. 149 In 
considering such applications, the Corps must take into consideration 
an evaluation of the proposed activity and of the activity's potential 
impact upon the public interest. 15o The review should be conducted 
144 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). The Act was designed to benefit the public by empowering the 
federal government, through the Corps, to exercise its authority over interstate commerce 
with respect to obstructions on navigable rivers. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294-
95 (1981). Corps regulations grant to the District Engineers the authority to enforce and 
regulate the applicable provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Clean Water Act. 
33 C.F.R. §§ 320.l(a)(6), 320.2, 320.3 (1987). The District Engineers are empowered with the 
discretion to issue, modify, suspend, condition, or revoke a permit. See generally 33 C.F.R. 
§§ 325.4, 325.7, 325.8. The Corps' decision, however, is normally upheld unless proven to be 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... " 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); see Missouri Coalition for Env't v. Corps of Engineers, 678 F. 
Supp. 790, 801 (E.D. Mo. 1988). 
145 33 C.F.R. § 320.l(a); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184,1187 (Ct. Cl. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U. S. 1017 (1982). 
146 See Deltona, 657 F.2d at 1187; Remarks made by Col. Thomas A. Rhen, Division Engi-
neer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New England Division, during a meeting held at Col. 
Rhen's office in Waltham, Massachusetts (October 13, 1987) (author was an observer at a 
meeting to negotiate a consent decree). For a survey and discussion of the Corps' jurisdiction, 
see Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, 63 VA. L. REV. 503 (1977). Col. Rhen noted that the country had not treated 
its water resources very well for the past 200 years; therefore, the Corps' current policy of 
scrutinous examination of proposed activities which may impact water resources is equivalent 
to making up for past "sins." 
147 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a). The Corps revised its regulations on December 18, 1968 to imple-
ment a public interest review, thus expanding from the prior, sole interest in preserving the 
navigability of United States waters. Deltona Corp., 657 F.2d at 1187. This new set of Corps 
regulations was judicially upheld in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
401 U.S. 901 (1971). 
148 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a). 
149 Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1986); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 
800 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding Corps' decision to issue permit for discharging 
fill material into wetlands). The public interest review regulations at 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a), 
apply to the review of all applications for Department of the Army permits. See also 33 C.F.R. 
§ 320.2(b). Applications for dockominium marinas generally involve a section 10 permit. At 
times, however, marinas require some land-fill at the waterline, thus necessitating a separate 
federal permit under § 404 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 
33 C.F.R. § 320.2(f). 
150 33 C.F.R. § 320.4. 
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to achieve a rational decision that reflects "the national concern for 
both protection and utilization of important resources. "151 The Corps 
must consider all factors relevant to the proposed activity.152 Each 
of the regionally situated District Engineers may grant a permit 
subject to the public interest review guidelines "unless [that] engi-
neer determines that [to do so] would be contrary to the public 
interest. "153 
Decisions of the Corps are accorded much deference. l54 Normally, 
courts reviewing Corps actions should give appropriate deference to 
the Corps' determination,155 by not substiting their own views for 
the decision reached by the COrpS156 or for the Corps' interpretation 
of its own regulations. 157 Moreover, the courts should adhere to such 
a standard of review when the agency action under review includes 
a balancing process such as the Corps' public interest review. 158 In 
light of such guidelines for judicial review, most Corps decisions will 
likely withstand appellate scrutiny. This deference amplifies the 
151 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a). 
152 Such factors include, but are not limited to, "conservation, economics, ... land use, 
navigation, ... recreation, ... considerations of property ownership and, in general, the 
needs and welfare of the people." [d.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 5 
(1970) (report of the House Committee on Government Operations listing factors to be con-
sidered in the Corps' review process). Consideration of socio-economic concerns must be 
limited to effects directly related to the proposed activity. Mall Properties, Inc. v. Marsh, 672 
F. Supp. 561, 566-67 (D. Mass. 1987), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d 440 (1st Cir.) (holding that 
the trial court's remand to the Corps did not provide finality needed to invoke appellate review 
jurisdiction), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988); Missouri Coalition for the Env't v. Corps of 
Eng'rs, 678 F. Supp. 790, 802-03 (E.D. Mo. 1988). It may be implied that the Corps may 
consider only those factors that are adequately related to impacts on the physical environment. 
Mall Properties, 672 F. Supp. at 566-67. 
153 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (emphasis added). The language of § 320.4(a) suggests that there is 
a presumption that the Corps will issue a permit "unless" the Corps finds that the submitted 
proposal does not meet the requirements of the public interest review. See Friends of the 
Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1986); Oklahoma Wildlife Fed'n v. United States 
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 681 F. Supp. 1470, 1487 (N.D. Okla. 1988) (upholding Corps' FONSI 
in a water transfer project). Indeed, there is very little judicial guidance as to whether or not 
such an inference exists. 
154 Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1986) ("In reviewing this public 
interest determination by the Corps, it is not our role to second-guess."). 
155 Environmental Coalition of Broward County v. Myers, 831 F.2d 984,986 (11th Cir. 1987). 
156 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 
519, 555 (1978) (judicial review of agency's consideration of environmental factors is a limited 
one); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) ("a court should [generally not] 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences"). 
157 Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of an 
Executive Order); Missouri Coalition for Env't v. Corps of Eng'rs, 678 F. Supp. 790, 801 
(E.D. Mo. 1988). 
158 Environmental Coalition, 831 F.2d at 986. 
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Corps' responsibility for properly evaluating the dockominium con-
cept. 
Only the Eleventh Circuit has even indirectly confronted and com-
mented on Corps action concerning the dockominium concept.159 It 
is not surprising that the issue has not been addressed by more 
courts, because the dockominium is a novel concept that has met 
with very little litigation. 160 In Matthews v. United States, 161 the 
Eleventh Circuit ruled on certain public recreational rights without 
directly discussing the dockominium's impact on the public trust. 
The plaintiff in Matthews alleged that the location of a dock adjacent 
to her property caused a diminution in the value of her property and 
obstructed her view of the cove. 162 She did not contest the legality 
of the dockominium as a discrete interest in property. The Matthews 
courts' reasoning concerning the public's rights as weighed against 
an individual's interest in a dockominium may, however, shed some 
light upon how courts might view the dockominium concept. 
In Matthews, the Corps granted a 35-year commercial concession 
lease to a private marina to furnish and maintain docks for private 
boats and to provide related boating services at a Corps-managed 
lake. 163 The lessee, as agent for eleven of its customers, applied to 
the Corps for the construction of a condominium-type dock on the 
159 Matthews v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 993, 1002-05 (M.D. Ga. 1981), a/I'd in part 
and rev'd in part, 713 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1983). The trial and appellate courts found improper 
the challenged federal permit issued for a dockominium pier, based chiefly on the interpretation 
of federal regulations and not on riparian rights or public trust considerations. [d. Other 
courts have adjudicated matters involving condominium-ownership marina and boat slips. See, 
e.g., McKnight v. Board of Directors, Anchor Pointe Boat-A-Minium Ass'n, Inc., 32 Ohio St. 
3d 6,6-7,512 N.E.2d 316,317 (1987) (condominium unit owners disputed the appointment of 
the association's board of directors); Deupree v. Ruffino, 505 So. 2d 1218-19 (Ala. 1987) (breach 
of contract action concerning the expectation that a boat slip space would be constructed); 
Dalzell v. Harlow, 129 N.H. 43, 43-45, 523 A.2d 54, 55 (1986) (condominium unit owner 
disputed the contractual language concerning access to the association's limited dock spaces); 
Lake Wylie Water Resources v. Rodgers Builders, 621 F. Supp. 305, 306-07, 307 nA (D. S.C. 
1985) (property owners sought to enjoin dredging operations associated with proposed con-
struction of dockominium facility). 
160 More often, dockominiums appear in legal actions as incident to other issues, such as 
property boundary disputes, riparian rights disputes, and condominium-based disputes. See 
cases cited supra note 159. 
161 Matthews v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 993 (M.D. Ga. 1981), a//'d in part and rev'd 
in part, 713 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1983). 
162 Matthews, 526 F. Supp. at 995 (trial court found that the Corps of Engineers issued 
improperly a permit for the dockominiums and ordered the unit owners to resell the slipspaces 
to the marina); Matthews, 713 F.2d at 679. But see Matthews, 713 F.2d at 681-82 (appellate 
court found the proper remedy to be the removal of the dockominium pier). 
163 The body of water in question is Lake Hartwell in the Piedmont Plateau region of Georgia 
and South Carolina. Matthews, 713 F.2d at 679. 
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lessee's separate land adjacent to the lessee's existing marina. l64 
Upon notice of the Corps' approval, the lessee marina built the 
designated "Dock F" and executed bills of sale for the slip spaces to 
pass title to the eleven individuals who had by then already formed 
an association. 165 
The district court found that Dock F was not a public commercial 
concession dock as contemplated by the lease. 166 The district and 
appellate courts ruled that the concept of private ownership, or 
private dominion over recreational resources, such as dock spaces, 
within a designated public recreational area, is against the public 
interest. 167 Dock F could not be considered public because: the lessee 
marina, as applicant to the Corps, was merely an agent for the eleven 
individuals, and was without supervisory control over the dock; the 
public was allowed no access to the dock; no public facilities or other 
services incidental to public marinas were provided; and the sale of 
the dock slip spaces was for an indefinite duration. l68 The district 
court also found that the ownership and utilization of a private dock 
in a public recreation area was a per se violation of management 
regulations of the lake. 169 On that basis, the district court ordered 
the lessee marina to purchase Dock F from the eleven individuals 
and operate the dock in conformity with normal public commercial 
docks, such as the lessee's existing marina. 170 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, ordered the removal of Dock F, 
because it found that the district court's order, which allowed the 
164 Under the terms of the lease, only the lessee marina could apply to the Corps with the 
dock construction proposal. Matthews, 526 F. Supp. at 996. 
165 Matthews, 713 F.2d at 679-80. 
166 Matthews, 526 F. Supp. at 1002. 
167 [d. at 1004; Matthews, 713 F.2d at 681. 
168 Matthews, 526 F. Supp. at 1003. 
169 [d. at 1004. The court found that the lessee could have built additions to the existing 
dock to accommodate any increase in demand (an increase that the court did not find to be 
substantial); and that the individuals could have applied to the Corps for permission to 
construct a private community dock in a limited development area at the lake. [d. at 1004-
05. Furthermore, it was not clearly in the "public interest" under regulations at 36 C.F.R. 
§ 327.30 (1981), to allow the individuals to own rather than rent dock space at the lake. [d. 
at 1004. The regulations at 36 C.F.R. § 327.30 dealt with the lakeshore management of civil 
works projects like the lake in Matthews. 
170 One noteworthy fact is that the Corps had previously ordered the lessee and the plaintiff 
Matthews to remove a private dock (that was being used by the plaintiff as a private dock) 
in the vicinity of Dock F's location, because the dock was located in an area reserved for the 
public'S use and had not been approved by the Corps. Matthews, 526 F. Supp. at 998. The 
previous dock was probably built without the necessary Corps permit, and was subsequently 
also denied a Corps after-the-fact permit. See 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e) (1987) (Corps regulations 
for after-the-fact permits). 
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eleven individuals to retain use of Dock F, would not be a sufficient 
remedy for the violation of a public marina lease. l7l The trial court 
merely ordered the sale of Dock F to the lessee, and did not enjoin 
the eleven individuals from using Dock F. Therefore, although title 
was transfered from the individuals, the individuals were still in 
possession of Dock F in accordance with their original design. Ac-
cording to the appellate court, the lower court's order would not 
operate to convert the dock from a private dock to one for public 
use. 172 
The Matthews ruling prevented a private encroachment upon a 
public recreational area. This ruling is consistent with the rooted 
doctrinal pronouncements that public rights in water, as protected 
by the public trust doctrine, override any private assertions of ri-
parian rights.173 The Matthews courts recognized that a public re-
source, held and managed by the government, must not be allowed 
to enter into private hands. Allowing the private Dock F to exist in 
a public lake, with no access provided to the public, would violate 
the government's duty under the public trust doctrine. The Mat-
thews case emphasizes the need for the Corps to give better consid-
eration to the potential harm resulting from reduced public access 
to the water. 
III. WILL THE DOCKOMINIUM STAY AFLOAT? 
As has been seen, the dockominium is a concept whose validity 
must survive several common law and regulatory tests. First, the 
dockominium must be a use consistent with the riparian rights doc-
trine. 174 Second, it must meet the test of the public trust doctrine. 175 
Third, it must receive a section 10 permit from the Corps.176 This 
Comment now addresses each of these issues, and concludes that 
the dockominium-so heavily reliant on the notion of private, exclu-
171 Matthews, 713 F.2d 681-82. 
1721d. at 681. The court further ruled that it was the location and operation of Dock F that 
violated the applicable regulations. ld. Thus, the plaintiff's view from her property weighed 
more heavily than the hardships caused by the removal of Dock F. ld. at 681-82. 
173 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. 
174 The dockominium must not violate any of the rights and responsibilities espoused by the 
riparian rights doctrine. See generally supra text accompanying notes 95-109. 
175 The dockominium must not violate the public trust principle that the navigable waters 
are held in trust by the states for the use and enjoyment of the public. See generally supra 
text accompanying notes 49-56. 
176 In virtually all instances, the placement of structures, including dockominiums, in the 
water requires a section 10 permit from the Corps. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982); see generally supra 
text accompanying notes 144-53. 
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sive ownership of a slip space in what was conceivably or actually a 
public facility-offends the public trust doctrine. Because it offends 
the public trust doctrine, the dockominium should find no safe harbor 
in a section 10 permit, which should be issued only upon a finding 
by the Corps that the public interest is served or at least not ad-
versely affected by a development. 
A. Riparian Rights 
The doctrine of riparian rights is implicated, because such riparian 
rights are subdivided and manipulated under condominium laws and 
conveyed separately to create dockominium units. 177 Condominium 
statutes that allow for the creation of condominiums in water provide 
convenient vehicles for the creation of dockominiums from subdi-
vided riparian rights. 17s The dockominium concept claims to be an 
ownership interest in the water with each unit's size and location 
defined by the dock slip space. 179 The purported creation of a prop-
erty interest in water that underlies the dockominium concept relies 
on the ability of the riparian proprietor to subdivide and convey 
parcels of riparian rights. ISO 
The balancing of the harms and benefits associated with the sub-
division of riparian rights suggests that such subdivision should, 
despite a lack of common law authority, be permissible. lSI A generic 
marina with fully operating docks and piers impacts the watercourse 
in the same way regardless of whether it is dockominium-owned or 
not. That is, permitted docks in the watercourse, whether used by 
renters or dockominium owners, do not offend the riparian rights 
doctrine because they· neither destroy the waterflow nor do they 
177 See supra text accompanying notes 24-27. 
178 See, e.g., Common Interest Ownership Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-200 to -293· 
(West 1986 & Supp. 1988); see supra text accompanying notes 34...,35. 
179 See supra text accompanying notes 24-27. 
180 The severance and separate conveyance of riparian rights with the aim of creating an 
exclusive interest in a defined locus of water conflicts directly with the prohibition of private 
water ownership as mandated by the public trust doctrine. 
181 Although this Comment concludes that the dockominium does not violate the riparian 
rights doctrine, this author maintains reservations concerning the legal propriety of wholesale 
subdivision of riparian rights. Such a manipulation of the riparian rights doctrine, through 
the use of subdivision, appears at first glance to be an awkward and impermissible expansion 
of law. The subdivision of riparian rights into parcels to facilitate dockominium conveyance 
hinges on the general recognition that riparian rights may be severed and subdivided many 
times over, all claiming to be appurtenant to one land tract. That conveyance arrangement 
can be interpreted to represent a distortion of the doctrine. Although courts have been 
relatively silent on the dockominium concept, judicial interpretation of the doctrine has not 
contemplated subdivision of riparian rights as required under the dockominium concept. 
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impact the exercise of riparian rights by other riparian owners. The 
transfer of a nonconsumptive right, as contemplated by the dock-
ominium concept, does not involve a significant or higher risk of 
expanded, altered, or detrimental use. 182 In essence, the dockomi-
nium creates no more harm, than do other similarly situated marinas, 
to the riparian rights doctrine. Thus, the creation of dockominiums 
through subdivision of riparian rights, from the perspective of the 
riparian rights doctrine, is not distinguishable from the operation of 
a conventional marina. 
B. Public Trust 
Although the dockominium does not offend the traditional exercise 
of riparian rights, its reliance on the notion of exclusive ownership 
or control in the water within a slip space runs counter to the public 
trust doctrine. Generally, the exercise of riparian rights implicates 
a relationship between neighboring riparian owners that involves 
rights, duties, and responsibilities concerning the waterflow of a 
commonly used watercourse. For example, the right to use the water 
is accompanied by a responsibility to not destroy the flow and quality 
of the water. With the public trust doctrine, however, the riparian 
owners' relationship is with the public. The creation of a dockomi-
nium suggests a claim of exclusivity in a slip space in the water that 
is in direct conflict with the public trust doctrine's premise that the 
water resource is owned by the public. 
The difficulty with the dockominium owner's claim of exclusivity 
is in the degree of interest that the dockominium owner seeks in the 
water. A water right may be sold or otherwise transferred like other 
property interests,183 but such an interest is only in the flow of the 
water and not in the water itself.184 The usage contemplated by the 
dockominium is an exclusive occupation of water space with a claim 
of title. The dockominium concept seeks more than just a preferred 
right to access the water. Indeed, it contemplates an ownership 
interest. Such exclusive claims parallel the situation that the two 
182 Butler, supra note 126, at 142; see 3 KENT, supra note 102, at *440 ("All that the law 
requires ... [of the riparian owner is] ... that he should use the water in a reasonable 
manner, and so as not to destroy, or render useless, or materially diminish, or affect the 
application of the water by the proprietors above or below on the stream. "). 
1&1 See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text. 
184 THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 273, at 452 ("The property rights are in the flow of water 
at the point of passage or beneficial uses that may result from it. "). 
852 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:821 
Matthews courts sought to undo by ordering the removal of a dock-
ominium pier. 185 
The public trust doctrine should not be manipulated to allow a 
conveyance of fee interest in the water.186 Permits issued by regu-
latory agencies for dock structures are essentially easements for the 
construction of the physical dock for a particular purpose, and such 
permits expressly deny any grant of title and meticulously delimit 
the nature and extent of the rights conferred by the permit. 187 The 
permits authorize the floating dock to encroach upon the water sur-
face, and sometimes the submerged bed, as an exercise of the ripar-
ian right to wharf out from the upland. 188 Thus, the current regula-
tory actions of governmental agencies, such as the Corps, are 
consistent with the traditional public trust notion of allowing access 
to water via wharfage. 189 Agencies rightly allow individuals to place 
docks in the water for the purpose of access, but they do so by 
issuing permits, not title to the water.190 Given that the submerged 
lands and the navigable waters belong unquestionably to the people 
by virtue of the public trust,191 to allow private individuals to claim 
the dockominium slip space or the water within the slip space as a 
property interest is violative of the public trust doctrine. 192 
C. Section 10 Regulation 
Despite the dockominium's conflict with the public trust doctrine, 
the Corps and other regulatory agencies are not prohibiting dock-
ominiums. 193 Dockominium proposals undergo public interest review 
as required by Corps regulations. The Corps, however, has no known 
185 See Matthews v. United States, 713 F.2d 677, 681-82 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'g in part and 
rev'g in part 526 F. Supp. 993 (M.D. Ga. 1981). 
186 See, e.g., RR. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 298, 300 (1968) (municipalities are 
generally without authority to permit encroachments over public ways in the absence of 
legislative approval). 
187 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 91, § 15 (1987); 33 C.F.R § 320.4(g)(6) (1987) ("A [Depart-
ment of the Army 1 permit does not convey any property rights, either in real estate or 
material, or any exclusive privileges."); see also 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(c)(3) (Department of the 
Army nationwide permits do not give property rights). 
188 Pilings are sometimes used to secure the dock to the submerged bed. 
189 See, e.g., Town of Orange v. Resnick, 94 Conn. 573, 582, 109 A. 864, 867 (1920). 
190 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(g)(6). 
191 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. 
192 See Sax, supra note 54, at 484; see supra text accompanying notes 50-65. 
193 Regulatory agencies issue permits for dockominium arrangements. (Copies of Corps 
permits that authorize dockominiums are on file with the author.) 
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policy as to the validity of the dockominium's claim of property 
interest in the water. 194 
Regulatory agencies are not antagonistic to the dockominium per 
se, but rather are concerned with its ancillary effects on the boating 
community.195 This concern stems from the view that the dockomi-
niums' popularity has resulted in a decrease in boat yards. 196 Boat-
yards and marinas are being acquired for the development of water-
front condominiums with private access to a dockominium facility. 197 
This removes boat dock spaces from the public market and also 
deprives the public of services provided by the former boatyard. 
Unless the boatyard is relocated or replaced, its elimination would 
damage local boating services. The removal of public access and 
services that the yard had provided would be a hard-felt loss should 
the rate of dockominium conversions increase. 
Regardless of the apparent impact on the availability of commer-
cial and public marinas, the dockominium must be measured against 
the limits of established law. The public trust doctrine specifies that 
the government, through its many agencies, must protect all public 
resources that are held in trust. Given that, by its terms, a section 
10 permit does not convey any property interests,198 and that public 
interest review must consider benefits and harm to the public,199 the 
Corps should not permit dockominium facilities. 20o To authorize per-
mits for dockominiums is tantamount to breaching the public trust 
by allowing individuals to claim title, and thus exclusivity, to water 
that has previously been owned, ultimately, by the pUblic. 
Permit applications for the construction and maintenance of large 
dockominium facilities should not pass the muster of the Corps' 
public interest review. Considering that regulations and judicial de-
cisions prohibit the conveyance of title to the water,201 any dock-
ominium proposal should fail the public interest review. The Corps 
should not approve the dockominium, then, for the primary reason 
that approval of the section 10 application would amount to the Corps 
giving away public property, the consequence of which is that some 
194 Although the Corps has made no official policy, individual officials have expressed con-
cerns about the dockominium. See Valiton Interviews, supra note 18. 
195Id. 
196 Id. 
197Id. 
198 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(g)(6) (1987). 
199 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.l(a), 320.4(a) (1987). 
200 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
201 See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
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individuals will be able to use public waters to the exclusion of 
others. Such a conclusion is extreme, yet legally supportable. The 
Corps should adopt such a policy regardless of the fact that dock-
ominium facilities may pose no more danger to navigation than do 
other marina facilities. 202 
The dockominium is not inherently harmful to society or to the 
water environment. After all, the concept was a pure creature of 
economic demand. Boaters residing inland desired secured boating 
privileges. The dockominium merely responds to that hunger by 
promising an exclusive perpetual interest in a defined locus of water. 
Such an arrangement, however, is prohibited by the public trust 
doctrine. No matter how harmless a pleasure boat in the water may 
appear, the dockominium concept exists in defiance of the public's 
ownership and right of access to the water. The Corps is no longer 
concerned only with matters of navigability.203 Indeed, the Corps 
has adopted a public interest review method to analyze the use to 
which a structure will be put. In that light and in light of the public 
trust doctrine, the Corps appears bound by law and its own regu-
lations to deny permits to dockominiums. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The American demand for access to recreational water resources 
has created a proliferation of dockominium marinas. There is sub-
stantial economic profit to be had by the marina owner or developer, 
just as developers have taken advantage of the land condominium 
boom. The creation of a dockominium, however, is in conflict with 
the public trust doctrine. 
Although the dockominium concept appears to be protected by 
current governmental inaction and encouraged by free-market eco-
nomics, the dockominium is in conflict with a policy of maintaining 
free and equitable access to the public water resources. More im-
portantly, the dockominium concept appears to be a business crea-
ture vulnerable to legal attack. The expansion of riparian rights to 
such a novel use oversteps the bounds of the public trust doctrine 
due to an expressed claim of ownership of the water. The public 
trust doctrine reserves, to the public, ownership of the water and a 
paramount right of navigation in the water. This conflict with the 
202 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
203 Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1187 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 1017 (1982). 
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basic principles of the public trust doctrine should doom the dock-
ominium. 
It is apparent from the lack of judicial treatment of the dockomi-
nium concept that the Corps bears the major responsibility for eval-
uating the appropriateness of the dockominium. The dockominium 
is an economic alteration of long-established boating activities. No 
visible harm is created, but individuals are reaping private gains to 
the detriment of the public. The Corps must review its own public 
interest review criteria when considering applications for dockomi-
nium facilities. In doing so, the Corps should conclude that the 
dockominium violates the public trust doctrine. 
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